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Prosecutors and Bargaining in Weak Cases: A Comparative View
Jenia Iontcheva Turner
I. Introduction
One of the most controversial uses of prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining concerns
cases involving weak evidence of guilt. When a prosecutor bargains about the charges or even
the facts in a case with weak evidence, at least three problems may arise. First, if the charge
bargain is generous, it may coerce an innocent defendant to plead guilty. Second, such a bargain
may let a guilty defendant off too easily, thus disserving the public and victim’s interests. Third,
if the parties bargain about the facts, the result may distort the truth of the case.
In this chapter, I examine how three major legal systems—those of the United States,
Germany, and Japan—approach these potential problems. To do so, I discuss how prosecutors in
these systems would resolve a hypothetical criminal case involving weak evidence. I have
chosen to compare the United States, Germany, and Japan because of their distinct approaches to
both plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion. In the United States, prosecutors have largely
unfettered discretion in both charging and plea bargaining. Germany allows a form of sentence
bargaining that involves both the prosecutor and the judge, but sharply limits prosecutorial
discretion with respect to charging and prohibits charge and fact bargaining. Japan does not
allow any explicit bargaining, but gives prosecutors broad discretion to refrain from filing
charges.
After describing the relevant differences in the prosecutors’ role in these countries, I raise
several questions about the proper approach for prosecutors in evidentially weak cases. While
none of the systems I discuss has a perfect solution to the problem of factually weak cases, the
comparison may encourage us to rethink three key features of American-style plea bargaining:
our practice of aggressive charge bargaining, particularly in cases where the evidence is weak;
the lack of limits on plea discounts; and the limited external and internal review of prosecutorial
charge bargaining decisions.
II. United States
Consider the following hypothetical situation:
The defendant is charged with rape, but there is a question about the identity of
the perpetrator. The only witness to the crime is the victim, and before identifying
the defendant, she picked out a different suspect from a photographic array. Some
physical evidence points to the defendant, but on the whole, the physical evidence
is inconclusive. After investigating the case, the defense attorney believes his


This chapter is based in part on my work in Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Plea Bargaining Across Borders (New
York: Aspen Publishers, 2009). I thank Jeff Bellin, John Turner, Thomas Weigend, and the editors for their helpful
comments on the draft, and the Beverly and David Leonard Faculty Research Fund for a generous grant supporting
this project.
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client is innocent and believes he has a good chance of securing an acquittal. The
prosecutor, who thinks the defendant is guilty, but has doubts about the strength
of the evidence, offers to permit a guilty plea to simple battery. A battery
conviction would lead to a sentence no greater than 30 days of imprisonment, and
there is a good possibility that the defendant will receive probation. When the
defense attorney informs his client of this offer, he emphasizes that there is a good
chance of acquittal at trial. The defendant’s reply is simple: “I can’t take the
chance.”1
The case outlined above concerns one of the more controversial uses of plea bargaining
in the United States—the prosecutor believes a defendant is likely guilty, but because the
evidence is weak, the prosecutor offers a large sentence reduction in exchange for a guilty plea.
This is not an uncommon occurrence. The strength of the evidence in the case is one of the most
important factors in prosecutors’ decision to bargain. Several features of the American criminal
justice system allow prosecutors to bargain away weak cases.
First, in almost all jurisdictions, prosecutors are free to bargain about charges, and there
is no requirement that the charge bargain fully and adequately reflects the facts of the case. A
few jurisdictions have attempted to limit or prohibit charge bargains, but these attempts have not
had lasting success.2 Others, such as the federal system, have attempted to restrain fact
bargaining, but these limits are also observed inconsistently.3
Furthermore, there are few restrictions on the concessions that a prosecutor can offer a
defendant in exchange for a plea. In the rape case outlined earlier, in addition to reducing the
charges, the prosecutor could offer to recommend to the court a very short suspended sentence
and probation, as compared to a much longer prison sentence in the event of a conviction after
trial. Because there are no limits on plea discounts and no requirement that the sentence be
proportionate to the defendant’s guilt, the prosecutor can make offers that are so attractive that
even an innocent defendant might accept them. The severity of baseline sentences in the United
States increases the possibility that plea discounts would be significant and therefore coercive.4

1

This hypothetical is loosely based on a real case noted in Albert W. Alschuler, “The Prosecutor’s Role in
Plea Bargaining,” University of Chicago Law Review 36 (1968): 61.
2

Russell D. Covey, “Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings,” Tulane Law
Review 82 (2008): 1261-65; Teresa White Carns and John Kruse, “A Re-Evaluation of Alaska’s Plea Bargaining
Ban,” Alaska Law Review 8 (1991): 27-69; Robert A. Weninger, “The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study
of El Paso County, Texas,” UCLA Law Review 35 (1987): 296; Ronald Wright and Marc Miller, “The
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff,” Stanford Law Review 55 (2002): 61-66.
3

Covey, “Fixed Justice,” 1261-65; Ronald Wright and Marc Miller, “The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff,”
61-66, 116.
4

One study estimates that sentences are on average three times more severe in the United States than in
Germany. Richard S. Frase and Thomas Weigend, “German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform:
Similar Problems, Better Solutions?,” Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 18 (1995): 34748; James Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide Between America and Europe
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 71. In Japan, too, average sentences for comparable offenders are
significantly lower (and typically suspended) than in the United States. Daniel H. Foote, “The Benevolent
Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice,” California Law Review 80 (1992): 352-55; Motoo Noguchi, “Criminal
Justice in Asia and Japan and the International Criminal Court,” International Criminal Law Review 6 (2006): 596.
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There is also no meaningful judicial oversight over the prosecution’s decision to bargain
about the charges and facts. Prosecutors are free to withdraw charges at any point in the
proceeding. While judges can review the charges filed to ensure there is sufficient evidence to
support them, they cannot add or modify counts or replace the charges with more serious ones to
ensure that the charges fully reflect the facts of the case. 5 Once the parties have agreed to a
particular charge bargain, judges can either accept or reject the agreement but cannot modify it.6
Judges must ensure that the defendant’s guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and factually based,
but the factual basis review is typically quite superficial in practice.7
In most American jurisdictions, prosecutors’ bargaining and charging decisions are rarely
subject to internal review. At the state level, supervisors tend to oversee such decisions only in
more sensational or politically charged cases.8 Even in the federal system, where supervision is
more regular, plea bargains are usually reviewed only in high-profile cases or when a defense
attorney or a judge alerts the supervisor to a problem.9
The environment in which American prosecutors work and advance also encourages
aggressive charge bargains in factually weak cases. Most prosecutors handle very heavy
caseloads and feel pressure to dispose of their cases efficiently. In theory, American prosecutors
might dispose of cases more quickly by being very selective during the charging process and
rejecting cases that are not likely to meet the burden of proof at trial.10 But the incentives for
most American prosecutors disfavor this solution. To advance in their career, prosecutors must
show a high rate of convictions. Dismissing weak cases does not help them achieve this goal, and
losing cases at trial squarely conflicts with it. In any case in which the evidence is not solid,
negotiating a plea bargain with the defendant seems the optimal approach for prosecutors. It
allows them to secure a conviction without the time, resources, and unpredictability of trial.
Prosecutors will therefore often be willing to reduce charges significantly and even agree to a
different version of the facts, as long as they can obtain an easy conviction in a complicated case.

5

In re United States, 345 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1437-38 (10th
Cir. 1995); William T. Pizzi, “Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of
Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform,” Ohio State Law Journal 54 (1993): 1353.
6

Jenia Iontcheva Turner, “Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View,” American
Journal of Comparative Law 54 (2006): 202 n.6.
7

Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Plea Bargaining Across Borders (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2009), 41-42.
Even if American judges wanted to conduct a more searching factual basis inquiry, they lack some of the tools to do
so. Unlike their German and Japanese counterparts, for example, they do not have at their disposal the investigative
file containing all the evidence gathered by the state. Courts therefore have to rely primarily on their own
questioning of the defendant as to the facts underlying the guilty plea.
8

David T. Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002), 153.
9

Mary Patrice Brown and Stevan E. Bunnell, “Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal
Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia,” American Criminal Law Review 43 (2006): 1082-83.
10

New Orleans District Attorney Harry Connick implemented this type of screening policy without suffering
electorally for it—but as Marc Miller and Ron Wright have pointed out, prosecutors must proactively make the case
for hard screening policies because the public may not automatically favor such an approach. Miller and Wright,
“The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff,” 60-66, 115-16.
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These features of the American system raise the concern that innocent defendants might
feel coerced to plead guilty when offered charge bargains that are much more favorable than the
possible outcome at trial.11 In a recent study of exonerations, Samuel Gross and his team of
researchers found that about six percent of exonerated defendants they studied had pleaded
guilty.12 Fifteen innocent murder defendants and four innocent rape defendants pleaded guilty in
exchange for long prison sentences in order to avoid the risk of life imprisonment or the death
penalty. While Gross and his colleagues focused only on cases involving death or a long prison
term, the numbers are likely to be even higher in less serious cases.13
Conversely, another problem with such charge bargains is that if the defendant is in fact
guilty of the original charge, the bargain may seriously misrepresent the facts and the gravity of
the offense. An example of this problem was revealed during a recent investigation by the Dallas
Morning News of a series of decisions by Dallas prosecutors to recommend probation in
homicide cases.14 In a number of these cases, the prosecutors believed the suspect was guilty but
were concerned that weaknesses in the case might have led to acquittal at trial. Instead of risking
an acquittal, they offered deferred adjudication and probation to defendants who agreed to plead
guilty. To obtain a conviction, prosecutors were willing to dispose of the cases in an
extraordinarily lenient fashion.
III. Germany
Could the hypothetical charge bargain discussed earlier take place in Germany? For
several reasons I believe it is very unlikely to occur. While sentence bargaining has become
commonplace in Germany—and as of last year was officially authorized by the German
legislature15—charge and fact bargaining are still formally prohibited. Decisions by the Federal
Supreme Court, as well as the recent legislation on plea bargaining, specifically forbid “bargains
about the verdict,” which include charge and fact bargains. 16 This prohibition applies with full
force to serious cases.17
11

See, for example, Reese Dunklin and Brooks Egerton, “Unequal Justice: Prosecutors’ Ploy in Shaky
Cases,” Dallas Morning News, November 14, 2007, 1A; Brooks Egerton and Reese Dunklin, “This Case Cannot Be
Proven: Though They Knew Guilt Was Far from Certain, Prosecutors Played To Win,” Dallas Morning News,
November 14, 2007, 13A.
12

Samuel Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003 (2004), 12,
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/usprograms/focus/justice/articles_publications/publications/exonerations_20040419
/exon_report.pdf.
13

See John D. King, “Procedural Justice, Collateral Consequences, and the Adjudication of Misdemeanors,”
in the present volume.
14

Reese Dunklin and Brooks Egerton, “In Some Cases, It’s High Crime, No Time,” Dallas Morning News,
November 12, 2007, 1A.
15

Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Rechtausschusses, [Decision and Recommendation Report of the
Legal Committee], May 20, 2009.
16

Ibid.; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], March 3, 2005, BGH GSt 1/04.

17

Prosecutors have various tools to summarily dispose of a large percentage of less serious cases before trial.
Beatrix Elsner and Julia Peters, “The Prosecution Service Function Within the German Criminal Justice System,” in
Coping with Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems: The Rise of Prosecutorial Power Across Europe, eds. JörgMartin Wehle and Marianne Wade (Berlin: Springer 2006), 207, 219-23; Marianne Wade, “The Januses of Justice:
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Some limited charge bargaining occurs in less serious cases where prosecutors have
greater discretion to refrain from filing charges. In such cases, where the defendant’s guilt is
“minor,” prosecutors may refrain from pressing charges if the defendant agrees to fulfill one of
several conditions, such as compensating the victim or paying money to the treasury or a
charity.18 Prosecutors may also decline to file charges with respect to insignificant offenses,
when the same defendant has committed more serious offenses as well, and the less serious
charges would not have a material effect on the sentence the defendant receives. 19 On the same
grounds, with the agreement of the parties, the court may dismiss filed charges that it considers
insignificant and immaterial to the sentence.20 These provisions occasionally lead to
“understandings” between the parties (often including the court as well), about the declination or
withdrawal of charges in exchange for concessions by the defendant. Fact bargaining may also
occur informally in some less serious cases, but this appears to be rare. 21 In interviews I
conducted, German prosecutors and defense attorneys have asserted that fact bargaining does not
occur and expressed general disapproval of the practice.22
There are several reasons for the rare use of charge and fact bargaining. To begin with,
there is a longstanding tradition of limiting prosecutors’ ability to refrain from filing charges.
Under the “legality principle” (also known as the principle of mandatory prosecution), at least in
more serious cases, prosecutors must file the charges that the evidence supports. This principle
dates back to the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1877 and is used to enforce the law equally and
protect against prosecutorial bias.23 Both in their training and supervision, prosecutors are taught
the importance of the mandatory prosecution principle. Complaints by victims also provide an
effective enforcement mechanism. When a prosecutor dismisses charges for lack of evidence,
victims can file a departmental complaint to demand that charges be instituted. If the
departmental complaint fails, victims can bring an action in court to demand prosecution.24
While this occurs rarely in practice, prosecutors have to take it into account in their charging
decisions.25 At least in more serious cases, then, German prosecutors are relatively more likely to
file the correct charges, even when they have some doubts about the strength of the evidence.

How Prosecutors Define the Kind of Justice Done Across Europe,” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and
Criminal Justice 16 (2008): 438-40, 445-46.
18

Strafprozessordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], §§ 153(1), 153a(1).

19

StPO § 154(1).

20

StPO §§ 154a(1)-(2).

21

A sort of fact bargaining may occur when the parties agree to resolve a case under Section 153(a)(1) , even
though the defendant’s culpability is not minor. Bernd Schünemann, “Absprachen im Strafverfahren? Grundlagen,
Gegenständen und Grenzen,” B19 (1990) [Agreements in Criminal Proceedings? Fundamentals, Purpose, and
Limits]; Raimund Hassemer and Gabriele Hippler, “Informelle Absprachen in der Praxis des deutschen
Strafverfahrens,” [Informal Agreements in German Criminal Practice] StV 8 (1986): 360, 363.
22

Turner, “Judicial Participation,” 239.

23

Joachim Herrmann, “The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Germany,” University of Chicago Law Review 41 (1974): 469.
24

StPO §§ 172-175.

25

Thomas Weigend, “Germany,” in Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study, ed. Craig M. Bradley (North
Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2007), 243, 262.
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Moreover, German prosecutors see themselves as semi-judicial figures, not as advocates
in a narrow sense, and a high conviction rate is not central to their success and advancement.
Unlike American district attorneys, chief prosecutors in Germany are civil servants and do not
have to worry about electoral defeat when they have a relatively modest conviction rate. As a
result, they are not as likely to put pressure on their subordinates to increase conviction rates.
German line prosecutors are evaluated in part based on their efficiency in resolving cases, but
they can achieve such efficiency through dismissals or diversion of less serious cases.26
Moreover, other factors, such as “intra-office relations; legal analysis and drafting; and the
avoidance of judicial rebuke and citizen complaint,” are just as important to their career
advancement.27 Failure to obtain a high number of convictions is not seen as a blemish on a
prosecutor’s record. To the contrary, if a prosecutor is perceived as cutting corners to obtain
convictions, this is likely to undermine her standing among her peers. For these reasons, German
prosecutors are not driven to strike bargains in weak cases. If they believe a suspect is guilty of a
serious crime but have some doubts about the strength of the evidence, prosecutors are likely to
file charges and pursue the case to trial rather than attempting to bargain it away.28
Another reason why charge bargaining occurs rarely is that German prosecutors operate
in a system that is devoted above all to uncovering the substantive truth of the case.29 In this
system, courts have broad powers to oversee prosecutorial decisions to ensure that the facts of
the case are fully investigated. The court’s duty to create a complete and accurate record of
events is a longstanding principle enshrined in the Criminal Procedure Code and is repeatedly
emphasized in judicial decisions and legal scholarship.30
As a result of the commitment to investigating the precise truth of a case, German courts
have a duty to intervene and correct attempts by the parties to dispense with certain facts. The
Federal Supreme Court has held that a court must not accept a mere formal confession as support
for a guilty verdict. Instead, a “confession… must at least be so concrete that the court can
determine whether the confession reflects the facts presented in the case file to such an extent
that a further examination of the matter is not necessary.”31 So even after a plea bargain has been
arranged, the proceedings must continue to ensure that the defendant’s confession is supported
by other evidence.
26

See Shawn Boyne, “Is the Journey from the In-Box to the Out-Box a Straight Line? The Drive for
Efficiency and the Prosecution of Low-Level Criminality in Germany,” in present volume.
27

John H. Langbein, “Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It,” Michigan Law Review 78
(1979): 217 (citing Thomas Weigend, Anklagepflicht und Ermessen: Die Stellung des Staatsanwalts zwischen
Legalitäts und Opportunitätsprinzip nach deutschem und amerikanischem Recht (1978), 98-102). [Charging Duty
and Discretion: The Position of the Prosecutor between the Legality and Expediency Principles under German and
American Law].
28

Weigend, “Germany,” 262.

29

Thomas Weigend, “Is the Criminal Process About Truth? A German Perspective,” Harvard Journal of Law
and Public Policy 26 (2003): 168.
30

StPO § 244(2); BVerfG, Kammerbeschluß vom 27. Januar 1987, NJW 1987, 2662, NStZ 1987, 419;
BGHSt 43, 195, Decision of August 28, 1997, translated in Stephen Thaman, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A
Casebook Approach (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 145-150; BGH, Decision of March 3, 2005, BGH
GSt 1/04.
31

BGH, Decision of March 3, 2005, BGH GSt 1/04.
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German judges have important tools at their disposal to examine the reliability of such
confessions. They have access to the entire investigative file, in which the prosecution and police
are supposed to include both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. Due to the principle of
“orality,” which is somewhat analogous to the American hearsay rule, judges cannot formally
rely on the file to support their judgment. But the file does inform judges’ understanding of the
case when they decide whether to accept a confession and the related agreement. Moreover, the
requirement that prosecutors include exculpatory evidence in the file ensures that both judges
and defense counsel have access to such information before negotiations.32 And because a
bargain does not entirely dispense with the trial, judges may still conduct further investigation by
questioning witnesses, calling experts, and requesting additional evidence.33
In interviews, German judges insist that they take seriously their duty to review the
evidence supporting negotiated confessions. They carefully review the file compiled by the
prosecution and ask clarifying questions to confirm the facts in the record. Judges end evidencegathering early only when, in addition to the confession, the written record before them clearly
establishes the defendant’s guilt. When the file reveals ambiguities in the evidence, judges
follow up with additional questions; when that is not enough, they gather further evidence.34 Of
course, some judges may be making self-serving statements, and a few concede that courts will
at times accept “quick confessions” without a thorough review of the evidence. 35 While a more
thorough empirical study of this question is necessary, it is notable that judges at least profess to
be scrupulous in reviewing the factual basis of bargained-for confessions.
German judges also have relatively broad powers to alter charges, thus limiting
prosecutors’ ability to engage in aggressive charge bargaining. When the charges do not
adequately reflect the underlying events, German judges can (after giving notice) convict the
defendant on different charges, including more serious ones.36 Indeed, once the indictment is
filed, prosecutors have limited say over the ultimate counts on which the defendant will be
convicted. At that point, only the court may reduce the charges, albeit with the consent of the
prosecution and under certain conditions.37 The court also has the exclusive power to dismiss a
case,38 as the prosecution cannot withdraw the charges after it has filed the indictment and the
main court proceedings have begun.39
Finally, German courts adhere to a notion of proportionality in sentencing, which further
reduces the possibility that prosecutors may enter into bargains that fail to reflect the
blameworthiness of the defendant. Under the proportionality principle, appellate courts may
32

StPO § 160(2). In fact, the provision goes further and requires prosecutors to actively seek exculpatory
evidence, but this is rarely observed in practice. Heribert Ostendorf, “Strafvereitelung durch Strafverteidigung,”
[Obstruction of Justice by Criminal Defense] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 28 (1978): 1348.
33

StPO §§ 155; 238; 244(2).

34

Turner, “Judicial Participation,” 227-28.

35

Ibid., 226-27.

36

StPO § 265(1).

37

StPO § 154(a).

38

StPO § 174.

39

StPO § 156.
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intervene to reverse a sentence that is unduly severe or unduly lenient, even when the sentence is
the result of a bargain. The Federal Supreme Court has emphasized that sentences must be
neither too lenient as a result of a plea bargain, nor too severe when negotiations have failed. 40 In
practice, bargained-for confessions tend to be rewarded with no more than a thirty-percent
reduction in sentences, and the baseline sentences are already substantially lower than those in
the United States.41 Compared with their American counterparts, therefore, German prosecutors
have less leverage to induce a defendant to confess. They can rarely bargain about the charges,
and they cannot credibly promise that the court will accept a recommendation for a significant
sentence reduction as part of a bargain.
For all these reasons, if a German prosecutor is faced with a case like the hypothetical
rape case described earlier, she is not likely to bargain away the charges. The prosecutor may
decline to file the charges because of the evidentiary difficulties. But the principle of mandatory
prosecution is likely to pull the prosecutor toward preferring charges in serious cases,
particularly since victims can demand judicial review of a decision not to prosecute in such
cases. If the prosecutor does proceed with the charges, the court may dismiss them for lack of
sufficient evidence.42 Finally, the case may go to trial. If that happens, there is a chance that the
defendant may be convicted of the more serious offense despite the evidentiary weaknesses. But
if either of the last two possibilities occurs, the outcome of the case will be based on the facts as
determined by the finder of fact after a transparent public process—not on the unreviewable
judgment by individual prosecutors as to the strength of the case and the culpability of the
defendant.
IV. Japan
A prosecutor in Japan handling the same hypothetical rape case would most likely
decline to file charges because of the case’s evidentiary weaknesses. He certainly would not
resolve the case by a plea bargain, at least not as openly practiced in United States. Japanese law
does not allow plea bargaining of any kind—there is no provision for bargaining in the criminal
procedure code, and the courts have held that confessions obtained through explicit promises of
leniency are involuntary and unconstitutional.43 Most Japanese scholars and practitioners also
assert that bargaining does not happen in practice.44
However, while explicit plea bargaining is not permitted, something similar may happen
by way of implicit understandings. For example, it is common for a Japanese defendant to
40

BGH GSSt 1/04, NJW 1440/05, Beschluss v. 3.3.2005; BGH 4 StR 240/97, Urteil v. 28.8.1997; BGH 1
StR 171/02, Beshluss v. 11.09.2002; BGH 4 StR 371/03, Urteil v. 19.2.2004.
41

Turner, “Judicial Participation,” 235; Frase and Weigend, “German Criminal Justice,” 347-48; Whitman,
Harsh Justice, 71.
42

This rarely occurs, however. Frase and Weigend, “German Criminal Justice,” 340.

43

Daniel H. Foote, “Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan: A Response,” UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 5
(1986): 101.
44

Fumio Aoyagi, Nihonjin no Hanzai Ishiki (1986), 201, cited in David T. Johnson, “Plea Bargaining in
Japan,” in The Japanese Adversary System in Context, eds. Malcom M. Feeley and Setsuo Miyazawa (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 140; David H. Bayley, Forces of Order: Policing Modern Japan (Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1991), 147; Foote, “Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan,” 97.
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confess to a crime in order to receive a sentencing discount, earlier release on bail, or suspended
prosecution.45 Courts and prosecutors tacitly accept these exchanges and even encourage them at
times. Japanese prosecutors are likely to recommend a lower sentence for a cooperative and
remorseful defendant and a harsher sentence for a non-cooperative one. 46 Judges regularly
follow prosecutorial recommendations and reward confessions and remorse with sentence
reductions and other benefits.47
But several features of these exchanges make them quite different from plea bargaining
in the United States—and especially from the kinds of charge and fact bargaining that occurred
in the rape case outlined earlier. To begin with, any exchange of concessions is implicit, not
explicit. Although prosecutors and courts rarely state this openly, defendants understand that if
they confess and show remorse, they are likely to receive a lower sentence. 48 Another difference
is that the average sentences in Japan for comparable offenders are significantly lower than
sentences in the United States,49 with any exchange of confessions between Japanese prosecutors
and defendants further reducing the potential punishment.
Moreover, the driving force behind the exchange of these concessions has been to
encourage the rehabilitation and reintegration of defendants. Prosecutors and courts do not offer
leniency to defendants who merely formally acknowledge guilt. A remorseful attitude is a
precondition to a lower sentence because a remorseful defendant is seen as more likely to be
rehabilitated.50 There is reason to believe that, as the prosecutorial caseload grows and cases
become more complex, the need to expedite cases will become more relevant to the exchanges
between the prosecutor and the defense.51 But for the moment, rehabilitation and reintegration
are the key values that undergird prosecutorial decisions to offer leniency in exchange for a
confession.
In addition, the Japanese criminal justice system, like that of Germany, emphasizes the
search for substantive truth. Japanese prosecutors and courts strive for what commentators call
“precise justice.”52 Judges write detailed reasoned judgments, laying out all the relevant
circumstances of the case. Even in simple cases in which the defendant confesses, judicial
45

Johnson, “Plea Bargaining in Japan,” 141; J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen, Measuring Judicial
Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 98-99;
Foote, “Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan,” 98-99.
46

Masahito Inouye, “Witness Immunity and Bargain Justice: A Look at the Japanese Concept of the
Adversary System,” in The Japanese Adversary System in Context, 173, 185-186 n.19; Johnson, “Plea Bargaining in
Japan,” 146; “Comments by Shu Sugita, Tokyo District Office Prosecutor,” in Crime and Criminal Justice in
Canada and Japan: Understanding Our Differences—A Report from the First Joint Canada-Japan Symposium, eds.
Neil Boyd and Monique Layton (Burnaby, B.C.: Simon Fraser University School of Criminology, 1991), 57.
47

Turner, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, 190.

48

Johnson, “Plea Bargaining in Japan,” 141; Joseph Sanders, “Courts and Law in Japan,” in Courts, Law and
Politics in Comparative Perspective, eds. Herbert Jacob et al. (New Haven: Yale, 1996), 344.
49

Foote, “Benevolent Paternalism,” 352-55; Noguchi, “Criminal Justice in Asia and Japan,” 596.

50

Carl F. Goodman, The Rule of Law in Japan: A Comparative Analysis, 2nd ed. (The Netherlands: Kluwer,
2008), 418-19, 422, 425; Foote, “Benevolent Paternalism,” 353.
51

Turner, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, 174-78.

52

Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice, 46, 264-72; Noguchi, “Criminal Justice in Asia and Japan,” 592.
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opinions may take as many as eight to ten pages to explain the decision.53 In contested cases,
judges “routinely write book-length manuscripts.”54 Because the requirement for precision is so
strict, prosecutors in Japan know that they need to submit extensive evidence to meet their
burden of proof. Prosecutors are very selective about the charges they file, therefore, and they
simply will not pursue a case that lacks sufficient evidence.55
Like their American counterparts, Japanese prosecutors have broad discretion in their
charging decisions. Even if they believe the evidence probably warrants the filing of charges,
they are not bound by a principle of mandatory prosecution and may choose to drop charges
altogether or at least suspend prosecution.56 Suspension may occur even in cases where the
evidence is strong, if the defendant confesses, repents, makes amends to the victim, and has no
prior record.57
But unlike in the United States, discretion is limited by significant controls within the
prosecutor’s office. As in Germany, charging decisions in Japan are subject to extensive internal
review, which helps ensure consistency and fairness across cases. Even in minor cases, a
decision not to file charges or suspend prosecution requires a consultation with two or three
supervisors.58 Prosecutors must provide reasons for deciding not to prosecute, and anyone
dissatisfied with the decision can appeal it to the chief of a superior prosecutor’s office.59
The strict supervision of prosecutors’ decisions to suspend or decline charges may seem
to deter such actions. But in fact, the environment in which Japanese prosecutors are evaluated
tends to promote declinations or suspensions of weak cases. Like their German counterparts,
Japanese prosecutors are career civil servants who are not under pressure to stack up convictions.
But there is another factor that favors dismissal of questionable cases. Japanese media and public
opinion are more likely to focus on acquittals of those who were wrongfully charged than on
failure to charge seemingly guilty suspects.60 If a prosecutor is seen as responsible for “mistaken
indictments” and “negligent acquittals,” his career is likely to suffer.61 Japanese prosecutors are
therefore much more likely to take “the risk that an uncharged offender will re-offend over the
risk that a charged suspect will be acquitted.”62
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In theory, judicial review also works to constrain prosecutorial decisions to charge in
Japan. Once the formal accusation has been filed, Japanese judges can review a prosecutor’s
decision to drop charges. When a prosecutor requests that charges be withdrawn or altered after
the accusation has been filed, the judge will review the request to ensure that the proposed
amendment to the charges does not “modify the identity of charged facts.”63 The judge may also
“order the public prosecutor to add or alter a count . . . when the court finds it appropriate during
the course of the proceedings.”64 In practice, judges rarely object to prosecutorial charging
decisions. 65 Still, the very possibility of judicial review may be sufficient to ensure that
prosecutors do not make concessions they would not be able to support before a court.
If a Japanese prosecutor decides not to file charges at all, a court does not have the
authority to review that decision.66 But a victim can file a complaint with a grand-jury type
institution called the Prosecutorial Review Commission (PRC), which can review the decision
not to charge and request that charges be brought. For much of their existence, PRCs were
largely ineffective because they were only able to issue nonbinding recommendations. As a
result of a 2004 amendment to the criminal procedure code, PRCs can now issue binding
instructions.67 This provision became operative in 2009, and it will be interesting to see how it
affects prosecutorial charging decisions.
All of this makes it highly unlikely that the kind of fact bargaining that occurred in the
hypothetical rape case would take place in Japan. Odds are that if the evidence in the case is not
compelling after interrogation, the prosecutor will not file charges.68 One result of this
conservative approach to charging is that the rate of acquittal at trial is astoundingly small—less
than one percent.69 Prosecutors’ charging decisions therefore effectively determine the outcome
of the case.
Another possibility in the hypothetical rape case is that the prosecutor may suspend
prosecution. The rates of suspended prosecutions have been rising over the last two decades,70
which raises an interesting question as to whether such suspensions are increasingly used to
dispose of cases with evidentiary difficulties. A suspended prosecution usually requires the
confession and cooperation of the suspect. Although it is not a formal conviction and is not
subject to judicial review, a suspended prosecution remains on a person’s record with the
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prosecutor and carries a certain social stigma.71 In some respects, therefore, a suspended
prosecution seems similar to an American charge bargain leading to a suspended sentence. But
unlike in the United States, a defendant in Japan must also show remorse and compensate the
victim in order to obtain suspended prosecution, even in cases in which the evidence of guilt is
weak.
V. Conclusion
When a prosecutor has a relatively weak case, but nonetheless believes a suspect is
guilty, she has to make a difficult choice—dismiss the case or proceed to trial despite the
weakness of the evidence. In the United States, prosecutors often avoid making this unpleasant
choice by striking a deal with the defense. But the use of bargaining raises thorny questions of its
own: Does it impose too great a pressure on innocent defendants to admit guilt in order to
receive a more lenient disposition? Does it allow guilty defendants to get off with an unduly mild
sentence? Should prosecutors be given the discretion to dispose of problematic cases in this
manner? What safeguards should be implemented to avoid the dangers that accompany such
discretion? The review of the American, Japanese, and German systems illustrates the
advantages and disadvantages of three different approaches to this quandary.
The approach of Japanese prosecutors is to be very selective about the cases they bring
forward. Unless a conviction is highly likely at trial, Japanese prosecutors refrain from filing
charges.72 But this conservative approach to charging may ignore the interests of victims in some
of these cases, particularly when prosecutors underestimate the possibility of winning at trial.
Arguably, it also disserves the public interest in deterrence by decreasing the incidence of
conviction and punishment. For these reasons, this approach is unlikely to be popular in the
United States, where chief prosecutors are often elected and would find it politically unfeasible
to decline to press charges in more than a very small number of cases. Moreover, when
prosecutors effectively make the judgment about guilt or innocence in all cases where this is a
real question, the public trial itself becomes a largely meaningless ceremony, where judges
merely “confirm that the defendant is guilty.”73
The other possible response to evidentially weak cases is to test more of them at trial
instead of dismissing them or bargaining them away. This is the approach that German
prosecutors tend to take, at least in the case of more serious crimes. Yet it is not clear whether
the benefit of having more cases brought to a public trial before a judge or jury outweighs the
risk of a wrongful conviction on more serious charges.
Along these lines, it would be interesting to engage in the following thought experiment:
Assume that no one but the defendant could know whether the defendant is guilty or innocent,
but the evidence would indicate there is an 80-90% chance that the defendant is guilty. Would it
ever be acceptable in such a case to have a system that allows the defendant to be convicted of a
lesser offense?
71
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In the abstract, a plea bargain that accurately prorates the charges and sentence to reflect
the evidentiary weakness of the case might be defensible, so long as it is entered into voluntarily
and with full knowledge by the defendant. But as actually attempted in the American system, this
approach has serious shortcomings. Long sentences and unregulated plea discounts impose
undue pressures on defendants to plead guilty, even if defendants are innocent of some or all of
the charges. In turn, the pressure on prosecutors to maintain a high rate of convictions
encourages them to bargain aggressively about the charges in order to obtain easy victories in
close cases. Limited internal and external review of prosecutors means that aggressive charge
bargains are rarely corrected. Various other factors—such as broad and overlapping criminal
statutes, inadequate prosecutorial disclosure requirements, and underfunded defense
representation—also reduce the likelihood that charge bargains would be fully informed,
voluntary, and factually based.74
It is debatable which factors are most to blame, but it seems clear that our current practice
offers a worse alternative than either outright dismissals or the trial of weak cases. In this light, it
would be instructive for American reformers to closely study the approaches of other systems,
like those of Germany and Japan. The comparison suggests the use of caution in allowing
prosecutors to dispose of evidentially weak cases through charge bargains. Neither Germany nor
Japan has a perfect solution to such cases. Japanese prosecutors may dismiss or suspend too
many cases that should proceed to trial, and German prosecutors may bring to trial too many
(serious) cases that should be dismissed. But both systems seem to do a better job of avoiding
plea bargains that are not based on the facts and impose unacceptable risks of coercing innocent
defendants to plead guilty. In these respects, they may serve as useful models for American
reformers interested in curbing the dangers associated with plea bargaining in cases where the
evidence is weak.
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